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Abstract
Defeasible argumentation is one of the approaches that addresses the challenges arising when we reason defeasibly,
with several formalisms in the literature reaching a mature state. Considering that most of these theories eventually
shifted their semantics towards dialectical characterizations, we believe that a sufﬁciently generic model of the process
of reasoning in dialectical terms could also serve as an abstract model of what happens inside an argumentative system.
To that end, we develop in this article a formal model of dialectical reasoning and explore its role as an alternative
semantics for argumentation theories.
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1 Introduction
The start of the 80’s mark a revolution in the Knowl-
edge Representation and Reasoning (KR&R) ﬁeld.
For thousands of years, KR&R formalism were re-
quired to be monotonic, in the sense that current re-
sults should not be invalidated by the addition of
new premises. However, most intelligent beings
appear to contradict this reasoning pattern, show-
ing non-monotonic features in their regular behav-
ior. Suddenly, monotonic reasoning became a burden,
deemed to be avoided [6, 7, 16, 8]. To overcome this,
a new kind of reasoning, called defeasible reasoning
(a form of non-monotonic reasoning), emerged as a
new ﬁeld within the KR&R community. In this con-
text, defeasible argumentation [9] is one of the ap-
proaches that addresses the challenges arising when
we reason defeasibly.
Nowadays, defeasible argumentation has become one
of the hottest topics in defeasible reasoning, with sev-
eral formalisms in the literature reaching a mature
state [19, 3, 25, 14, 10, 4]. Given its common ori-
gin, most of these system share several key aspects
among them. For instance, in the article surveying
the state of the art in argumentation systems [15],
Prakken and Vreeswijk identiﬁed the following core
notions as common to every formalism:
1. They provide an underlying logic.
2. They formally deﬁne the concept of argument.
3. They capture when two arguments are in con-
ﬂict.
4. They deﬁne when that conﬂict leads to a de-
feats.
5. They provide a mechanism for determining the
ultimate state of arguments.
Every argumentation system begins by deﬁning an
underlying logic where knowledge is expressed. Even
though these theories behave non-monotonically,
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mostoftheseunderlyinglogicstendtodeﬁneamono-
tonic entailment relation. The rationale is that the ad-
dition of new premises should allow the construction
of new arguments (possibly changing the conclusions
sanctioned by the system as a whole), without requir-
ing the withdrawal of previous deductions. These ar-
guments, the second notion in common, are usually
associated with proofs or deductions in the underlay-
ing logic. Simply put, an argument is a tentative piece
of reasoning supporting a given conclusion. How-
ever, not every conclusion drawn on this logic leads
to a valid argument, since these systems usually im-
pose additional restrictions on those derivations, such
as being based on non-contradictory premises, being
minimal, etc.
Regarding the third common aspect, every system
usually allows us to construct arguments for conﬂict-
ing conclusions. This relation among arguments is
also called attack or counter-argumentation in some
systems. Although the most obvious form of conﬂict
is the support of complementary conclusions, an ar-
gument may conﬂict with another for other reasons,
for example, when the ﬁrst denies a premise of the
second. Considering that this relation only captures
disagreement between arguments, it cannot tell appart
successful attacks from those that are not. The rela-
tion called defeat, fourth notion common to every ar-
gumentation theory, is a reﬁnement of the previous re-
lation that only accounts for successfull attacks. Note
that this relation captures the conditions under which
an argument is able to deny the conclusive force of
another argument, effectively disabling the latter. On
some systems, this relation is called attack or inter-
ference as well. Even though the conﬂict relation is
usually symmetric, the defeat relation is usually not:
some sort of argument comparison criterion is applied
to determine which argument prevails in those recip-
rocal conﬂicts.
Finally, defeat alone is not enough to determine the
ﬁnal state of an argument, as it only states what the
outcome of the conﬂict between two particular argu-
ments is. This key notion, also common to every ar-
gumentative system, is used to determine the set of
conclusions sanctioned by the formalism. Therefore,
several alternatives have been explored in the litera-
ture, for instance ﬁx-point vs. constructive seman-
tics, single vs. multiple state assignments, skeptic
vs. credulous stance, etc. All these proposals iden-
tify at least two disjoint sets: one containing those ar-
guments that are warranted, and the other containing
those that are not. In a sense, an arguments is war-
ranted when it is not defeated, or when its defeaters
are in turn defeated, since defeaters are arguments as
well. Note that this process may continue recursively,
as long as additional defeaters for any argument re-
main to be considered. This is the reason why war-
ranted arguments are sometime called undefeated in
some theories, though they have been termed justiﬁed
or just active too.
During the 90’s, several prominent formalisms started
shiftingtheirsemanticstowardsdialecticalcharacteri-
zations, abandoning their original ﬁx-point semantics
or recursive deﬁnitions. For instance, the recursive
deﬁnition of arguments active on a given level from
Simari-Loui’s theory [19] later became a dialectical
analysis structured as a tree [18], or the ﬁxpoint se-
mantics of Prakken and Sartor’s theory [13] was then
replaced by a dialogical game [14]. Nowadays, every
major argumentative system has been reformulated to
accommodate a dialectical variant of its semantics,1
whichgenerallyalsobecamethepreferredwayofpre-
senting it.
Considering how successful the shift towards dialec-
tical characterizations turned out to be, we postulate
that a sufﬁciently generic model of the process of rea-
soning in dialectical terms could also serve as an ab-
stract model of what happens inside an argumenta-
tive systems. To that end, this article lays the foun-
dations for such a generic model, whose particular
instantiations may double as an alternative seman-
tics for several concrete argumentation systems. This
generic model is initially introduced in the next sec-
tion. Then, Section 3 brieﬂy explores other works in
the literature which follow a like approach. Finally,
Section 4 presents the conclusions reached and out-
lines the work ahead.
2 Dialectical Protocols
This section develops an abstract semantics for argu-
mentation theories which is the result of the insight
that most of these formalisms also contemplate di-
alectical recasts of their semantics as a part of their
formal deﬁnition. To do so, we begin by discussing
the key aspects of dialectical argumentation in lay
terms, and then, in Section 2.2, we take into account
the identiﬁed aspects while introducing the set of no-
tions that compose a dialectical protocol. Finally, this
notion (and its particular instantiations), induce an en-
tailment relation, which constitute the desired seman-
tics.
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2.1 KeyAspectsofDialecticalReasoning
Suppose we want to describe what is going on inside
the mind of an intelligent reasoner that implements
a theory of dialectical argumentation. Let us imagine
thecontextwherethisreasoningusuallytakesplace: a
given agent comes up with a new claim, and it is about
to weigh the chance that claim have of being sanc-
tioned. This claim will be scrutinized under a careful
dialectical analysis, where reasons for and against it
are to be considered. Evidently, this agent must be
willing to assume at least two distinctive roles. Some-
times it will seek out reasons supporting this claim,
but often times it will become a sort of “devil’s ad-
vocate”, questioning those very same reasons it just
put forth. Note that this duality can be observed in
most argumentation systems too, where authors have
agreed to call proponent the role where it supports
the claim under consideration, and opponent the role
where it questions it. These reasons being argued for
and against the initial claim are all based upon the
same knowledge base, namely the knowledge base of
the agent performing both roles.
In order to introduce the remaining concepts, we have
to resort to a useful analogy also used to present the
dialectical ﬂavor of the semantics of many argumen-
tation systems: we will conceive the whole reasoning
processindialecticaltermsasifitwereagame, where
two contenders take turns to introduce further rea-
sons, either supporting or attacking the initial claim.
This intuitive analogy has been used to convey com-
plex concepts such as those that make up the dialec-
tical reformulations of Simari-Loui’s system [18] or
Prakken-Sartor’s theory [14].
Under this conception, one may wonder what a turn
or a move within this dialogical game stands for. It
is clear that each move should either consolidate or
attack the initial claim, according to the role being
performed. Considering the nature of the systems be-
ing modeled, it is safe to assume that these reasons
being put forward will be structured as logical argu-
ments. With this in mind, the exchange of these ar-
guments usually explores a given aspect of the topics
being disputed to the fullest extent, until no further ar-
gument can be played addressing it, to then start dis-
cussing another aspect, and another aspect, until all
the aspects of the initial topic are also exhausted. This
behavior is modelled in several of the theories of de-
feasibleargumentationasthenotionofargumentation
line [14, 10, 4]. An argumentation line is a mere se-
quence of related moves—an argument, followed by
one of its defeaters, followed in turn by a defeater of
this defeater, and so on.
We believe this concept plays a key role upon which
we erect our generic model of reasoning in dialecti-
cal terms. In contrast, other alternative proposals pre-
viously explored in the literature (later discussed in
Section 3) assign this central role to arguments. Our
decision stem from the fact that the notion of argu-
mentation line is the smallest piece of reasoning still
showing dialectical features; once we go down to the
argument level, it is quite difﬁcult to identify which
role dialectics plays there. For instance, we can de-
scribe in what state a given dispute is by providing the
set of all the (partial) argumention lines explored so
far. In a sense, this set of argumentation lines readily
represents a snapshot of the dispute being conducted.
Once we are able to grasp the different states a dispute
can be in, another issues should also be addressed,
such as:
• Which player should move next in a given con-
ﬁguration?
• What is the set of legal moves available in a
certain state?
• Is the dispute over? If so, which contender pre-
vailed?
These important aspects should be carefully consid-
ered, since answering these questions in way en-
tirely reasonable for a given context may preclude the
model from being applicable in some other context.
We can take this into account by not forcing these de-
cisions, only providing a scheme which should later
be instantiated according to the needs at hand. For in-
stance, every argumentation system clearly states how
proponent and opponent should alternate, which argu-
ments can be formulated in a given context, or what
has been the outcome of the dialectical analysis just
performed.
Finally, being able to formally capture each of the
states a given dispute may traverse is not enough, as
weshouldalsoconsiderhowthemrelatetoeachother.
In a sense, all the notions brieﬂy introduced so far
just model the static side of a dispute (for instance,
which move can be played next, or which argumenta-
tion lines have been explored so far), but we have not
captured its dynamics yet. Not whitstanding, we can
take its dynamics into account by means of a transi-
tionfunction, formallymodellingtheeffectofplaying
a certain move in the context of a particular state of a
dispute. Observe that this transition function is in fact
capturing the dynamics of the dialogical game, pro-
vided it relates the state of a dispute before and after
playing a move.60 Inteligencia Artiﬁcial Vol. 10, No 32, 2006
With this last concept we complete the discussion of
all the relevant aspects involved in the process of rea-
soning in dialectical terms. In the next section, we
present a set of formal deﬁnitions accounting for all
the aspects of dialectical reasoning just overviewed.
2.2 Formal Deﬁnition
According to the discussion in the previous section,
a dialectical dispute regarding a given claim T , ex-
pressed in a certain knowledge representation lan-
guage L, involves two contenders: the proponent of
the claim, P, and its opponent, O. Let KB be the
knowledge base available to both contenders, also ex-
pressed in terms of L (we only require from this lan-
guage to be able to express reasons or justiﬁcations in
a sound way, called in this context arguments), and let
args be a mapping from knowledge bases into set of
arguments, which provides the link between a knowl-
edge base and the set of all the arguments one can
formulate from that knowledge. The particular con-
ditions these arguments satisfy, or the process upon
which they are constructed, are aspects relevant only
to particular instantiations of our model, whereas this
initial formulation only concerns the framework it-
self. Not withstanding, since the reasoning we are
modelling is of an introspective nature, where the
same agent assumes both roles, we can deduce that
the set of arguments available to both P and O must
be args(KB).
These notions constitute the context where the dialec-
tical reasoning will take place, formally deﬁned as
follows:
Deﬁnition 1. (context)
Let us call context the tuple C = (L,KB,args),
where:
• L is the knowledge representation language be-
ing used, arbitrary but ﬁxed, in which it is as-
sumed one can formulate logical arguments.
• KB is the knowledge base, coded in terms of
L, available to both contenders.
• args is a mapping from knowledge bases into
set of arguments, relating each knowledge base
with the set of all the valid arguments that can
be built from it.
For the remainder of this section we will assume the
existence of an implicit context (L,KB,args), ar-
bitrary but ﬁxed. Going back to the analogy brieﬂy
introduced in the previous section between dialecti-
cal reasoning and a dialogical game involving the ex-
change of arguments, we begin by formally deﬁning
what each play or move represents:
Deﬁnition 2. (move)
Let us call move the tuple (contender,argument),
where contender is either P or O, and argument ∈
args(KB).
Given the move m = (contender,argument), we
may also refer to its contender as player(m) and to
the argument being played as arg(m). Now, moves
that relate with each other are usually structured as
argumentation lines:
Deﬁnition 3. (argumentation line)
Let T be a claim formulated in L. We say that an
argumentation line regarding T is the sequence of
moves hm0,...,mki, k ≥ 0, such that:
• m0 = (P,argument), where argument is an
argument supporting T .
Note that this deﬁnition requires from argumentation
lines to start with a move from P supporting the claim
being disputed. However, this deﬁnition fails to cap-
ture a subtle aspect of argumentation lines, as shown
in the following example:
Example 1. Consider the arguments:
• A = we should ﬁre John because he is missing
work.
• B = John is missing work because he is on a
leave of absence.
• C = John’s cat is ﬂuffy.
In this setting, a potential argumentation line regard-
ing whether we should ﬁre John may involve the
moves hm0,m1,m2i, where m0 = (P,A), m1 =
(O,B) and m2 = (P,C).
Granted, not every sequence of moves constitute an
argumentation line worth considering. For instance,
the sequence of moves described in Exam. 1 involves
unrelated arguments, which probably do not represent
theexplorationofanactualissue. Inordertoonlytake
into account related moves, the notion of argumenta-
tion line must be reﬁned with the help of a function
called legal, whose purpose is to determine the set
of moves that are allowed to extend a given argumen-
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argumentation lines and Moves the set of all the valid
moves, then legal should be a function from Lines
into P(Moves). Strictly speaking, this signature is
the sole restriction imposed over this function, since
its concrete deﬁnition is one of tasks involved in the
actual instantiation of the framework. The function
legal allows us to reﬁne the notion of argumenta-
tion line as follows:
Deﬁnition 4. (revised argumentation line)
Let T be a claim formulated in L. We say that an
argumentation line regarding T is the sequence of
moves hm0,...,mki, k ≥ 0, such that:
• m0 = (P,argument), where argument is an
argument supporting T , and
• for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, it holds that mi ∈
legal(hm0,...,mi−1i).
According to the discussion in the previous section,
having formalized the concept of argumentation line
allows us to tackle the state of a dispute:
Deﬁnition 5. (state of a dispute)
Let T be a claim formulated in L. We say that the
state of dispute regarding T is a non empty set of ar-
gumentation lines regarding T .
Even though this deﬁnition imposes few restrictions
over the state of a dispute, not every state will be
reachable in practice. For instance, those states rep-
resenting the continuation of a debate already won
by one of the contenders will not be reached during
an actual dispute, despite of being valid according
to Def. 5. Having modeled this notion, the same is-
sues previously considered during the discussion of
the key aspects of dialectical reasoning should also be
addressed. For instance, it is quite natural to ponder
who should play the next move, or which contender
may have won in a given state of a dispute. On the one
hand, recall that providing a concrete answer to any of
these issues can end up restricting the applicability of
the model being proposed. On the other hand, any
decision with respect to how to address them drasti-
cally affect the behavior of the model, so the policy
governing each of these issues will constitute a cen-
tral aspect of the dynamics of the model. To reconcile
both visions, we make use of a set of abstract func-
tions, barely characterized in the generic model, yet
required to be fully speciﬁed in every concrete instan-
tiation.
In what follows, let States be the set of all the possi-
ble states of a given dispute. We will make use of the
following auxiliary functions:
• toMove: deﬁned from States into {P,O}, de-
termining which contender must play next in a
given state of a dispute.
• winner: deﬁned from States into {P,O} ∪
{none} determining which contender (if any)
has prevailed in a given state of a dispute.
When no contender has prevailed yet, this func-
tion must return the constant none.
The function toMove models the so called burden of
the proof,2 which changes sides during the actual de-
bate [17]. Since this function allows us to inspect one
the features of the move about to be played (namely,
which contender is going to play it), it must agree
with the behavior of the function legal, which, in
a sense, also inspect other features of that move. To
illustrate this point, let us consider the following situ-
ation, where these functions do not concord:
Example 2. Consider the arguments:
• A = we should ﬁre John because he is missing
work.
• B = John is missing work because he is on a
leave of absence.
• C = John is missing work because he is on va-
cation.
Supposeweadoptadeﬁnitionforthefunctionlegal
allowing contenders to play any of the available ar-
guments as long as they do not replay them, and
a deﬁnition for the function toMove stating that
contenders must take alternating turns. In this con-
text, it is possible to explore the argumentation line
about whether we should ﬁre John hm0,m1,m2i,
where m0 = (P,A), m1 = (O,B), and m2 =
(O,C), since its ﬁrst move is appropriate, and the
subsequent moves uphold the restrictions imposed
by legal (i.e., both m1 ∈ legal(hm0i) and
m2 ∈ legal(hm0,m1i)). Not withstanding, this
sequence of moves where the opponent plays two ar-
guments consecutively does not uphold the ordering
required by toMove.
Simply put, to avoid the kind of conﬂicts suggested
by the previous example, we ought to make sure that
legal and toMove agree with each other. The con-
tender playing each of the moves compossing a given
2this notion usually has a different meaning in courts of law.62 Inteligencia Artiﬁcial Vol. 10, No 32, 2006
argumentation line must be exactly whoever toMove
would have required, should that line be the only line
explored so far. That is to say, we only consider a
move as valid when it is being played by whoever had
to play in that situation. Formally speaking, when-
ever (contender,argument) ∈ legal(line), then
it must also be the case that toMove({line}) =
contender.
The reader might wonder why not let legal also de-
termine which player should play next, both simplify-
ing the framework and rendering the above restriction
unnecessary. However, recall that legal only con-
cerns the current line of argumentation, whereas the
function toMove may have to consider all the lines
of argumentation being explored in the current state
of the dispute. Should we merge these notions, either
legal must take into account every moves played
so far, turning the notion of line of argumentation a
bit superﬂuous, or toMove will have to only refer to
the moves played in the line of argumentation being
explored, making impossible to enforce, for instance,
that contenders must take alternating turns.
Finally, once we are able to model all the states a
given dispute may traverse, we should then capture
how these states relate to each other. In a sense, all the
notions brieﬂy introduced so far just model the static
side of a dispute (for instance, which move can be
played next, or which argumentation lines have been
explored so far), but we have not captured its dynam-
ics yet. However, we can take it into account through
a transition function, formally modelling the effect of
playing a given move in the context of a particular
state of a dispute. This transition function by relat-
ing the state of a dispute before and after playing a
given move is actually capturing the dynamics of the
dialogical game we intend to model.
To do so, we must introduce the component that cap-
tures the dynamics of the dispute: the transition func-
tion next. This function, deﬁned from States ×
Moves × Lines into States, determines which state is
the outcome of playing a move extending a given ar-
gumentation line in the context of a certain state of
a dispute. Note that this function is the only compo-
nent of this model capable of modifying the state of
a dispute. No other component can create, change,
or eliminate argumentation lines. Following a simi-
lar approach as before, we specify this function in an
abstract manner, to avoid restricting the applicability
of the model. Once again, characterizing this abstract
function in a concrete way is one of the key tasks in-
volved in its instantiation.
Finally, we are ready to get together all the deﬁnitions
previously introduced along with the partially deﬁned
notions as follows:
Deﬁnition 6. (dialectical protocol)
Let C be a context. We say that a dialectical protocol
for C, noted DPC, can be characterized through the
tuple
(Moves,Lines,States,legal,toMove,winner,next)
where:
• Moves is the set of moves considered valid
(Def. 2).
• Lines is the set of argumentation lines consid-
ered valid (Def. 4).
• States is the set of all the possible states of a
dispute (Def. 5).
• legal is a function deﬁned over Lines into
P(Moves), that provides the set of moves that
are allowed to extend a given argumentation
line.
• toMove is a function deﬁned over States
into {P,O}, that determines which contender
should move next in a given state of a dispute.
• winner is a function from States into
{P,O} ∪ {none}, that establishes which con-
tender has prevailed in a given state of a dis-
pute, if any. We assume that the constant none
denotes that no one has prevailed yet (that is,
the dispute is still open).
• next is a function deﬁned over States ×
Moves × Lines into States, which captures the
dynamics of the dispute, that is, it describes the
effect of playing a given move in the context of
a certain state of a dispute.
Moreover, in order to preserve the internal con-
sistency of the dialectical protocol being de-
scribed, whenever (contender,argument) ∈
legal(line), then it must also hold that
toMove({line}) = contender.
In those cases where the context being referred to in a
dialectical protocol is evident, we shall note the pro-
tocol DPC just as DP.
We have at our disposal a set of deﬁnitions that
can capture the interaction that takes place inside a
generictheoryofdefeasibleargumentation. Sincethis
interaction in fact gives birth to the semantics of the
theories, we should carefully consider what ought to
be concluded from a concrete instance of a dialectical
protocol.Inteligencia Artiﬁcial Vol. 10, No 32, 2006 63
Deﬁnition 7. (entailment)
Let DPC be the tuple
(Moves,Lines,States,legal,toMove,winner,next)
which is a particular instance of a dialectical proto-
col, and let T be a claim formulated in L. We say
that T is entailed by DPC if, and only if, there exists
a ﬁnite sequence s0,s1,...,sn of states of a dispute
regarding T , such that:
• s0 = {hm0i}, where hm0i is an argumentation
line regarding T ,
• for each i, 0 ≤ i < n, there exists an argumen-
tation line hm0,...,mki ∈ si for which it is
possible to ﬁnd a j, 0 ≤ j ≤ k, such that there
exists a move m ∈ legal(hm0,...,mji),
that satisﬁes the following conditions:
– player(m) = toMove(si), and
– next(si,m,hm0,...,mji) = si+1.
• for each i, 0 ≤ i < n, winner(si) = none,
and
• winner(sn) = P.
Given the abstract nature of the entailment relation in-
duced by concrete instances of dialectical protocols, it
is possible to capture the semantics of many argumen-
tation systems within it. For instance, using dialec-
tical protocols one can describe Simari-Loui’s justi-
ﬁed literals [19], Defeasible Logic Programming war-
ranted beliefs [4], or the outcome of Prakken-Sartor’s
dialogue game [14] among others.
3 Related work
To begin with, this approach was ﬁrst suggested in
a groundbreaking work of R. Loui [5]. This author
was the ﬁrst to consider the existence of a generic
model for argument-based dialectical reasoning. He
successfully introduced a set of abstract notions that
were able to capture the dynamics of many attractive
theories of defeasible argumentation. However, Loui
involvement with this line of research was rather tan-
gential since he was mainly concerned with adding
resource-boundedness into defeasible argumentation.
Later, H. Prakken took Loui’s work in dialectical rea-
soning into what he calls dynamic debates involving
several agents [12]. He proposed a model of dialecti-
cal argumentation in accord to Loui’s designs, some-
what resembling the scenario depicted in Section 2.1.
This author did not explore what could have been
done with that model, using it only as a intermediate
stage, to be later reinterpreted as if it were a model
multiagent interaction. In particular, Prakken’s main
goalwastoallowtheagentstakingpartinthisinterac-
tion to dynamically modify their knowledge bases, a
key requirement, for instance, when the dispute being
modeled take place inside a court of law.
In a recent article [11], the same author extended this
line of research considering what properties are ob-
served by dialogue games of argumentation systems.
Given the dialectical nature of these dialogue games,
some similarities with the model developed in this
work are to be expected. For instance, Prakken’s
turn-taking function serve the same purpose as our
toMovefunction. Notwithstanding, themaingoalof
the framework introduced in that article was to study
the properties dialogue game posses, rather than char-
acterizing the set of conclusion a given dialogue game
might entail.
Finally, we too have pursued a similar line of research
over a series of articles [23, 20, 24, 21], striving to de-
ﬁneanabstractmodelfortheagentinteractioninmul-
tiagent systems. Even though an intermediate model
of dialectical reasoning was also introduced there,
that model never became the main focus of our atten-
tion, whereas now we intend to explore its potential
as a tool for studying the essence of argumentation.
4 Conclusions
In this article we have developed the concept of di-
alectical protocol, a framework whose particular in-
stantiations can serve as an alternative semantics for
argumentation systems. To that end, we observed that
mosttheoriesofdefeasibleargumentationadmitsadi-
alectical recast of its semantics. This suggests that a
sufﬁciently generic model of the process of reason-
ing in dialectical terms could also serve as an abstract
model of what happens inside an argumentative sys-
tem. Applying this strategy, we ﬁrst discussed the key
aspects of dialectical reasoning in lay terms, and then
proposed such generic model contemplating these as-
pects.
As a future work, we would like to explore modelling
the semantics of several argumentation theories us-
ing concrete instantiations of dialectical protocols, in
order to study the relation between their original se-
mantics and the set of entailed claims of their corre-
sponding dialectical protocols. Should they be proved
equivalent, we believe that dialectical protocols may64 Inteligencia Artiﬁcial Vol. 10, No 32, 2006
also serve as a testbed suitable for exploring the dif-
ferent properties of argumentation systems, a topic
being actively researched [22, 1, 2].
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